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FOREWORD
In recent years, China has made huge progress in reducing poverty and hunger, with more than 
130 million fewer people undernourished than at the start of the 1990s. The country’s historic 
achievements in this area augur well for the ability of governments around the world to achieve the 
ambitious objectives they have set themselves under Agenda 2030, set out in the seventeen Sus-
tainable Development Goals that were agreed at the United Nations in September 2015.
Beijing’s flagship annual policy statement, known as Policy Document no. 1, and issued by the Cen-
tral Committee and State Council following the start of the Chinese New Year, was in 2017 once 
again devoted to agriculture, farmers and rural development—a clear sign of the importance that 
Chinese policymakers continue to attach to progress in this area. The new policy document sets out 
a comprehensive vision for the agricultural sector, which in many respects seeks to respond to the 
challenges that the international community has identified in Agenda 2030.
Chinese policymakers are now looking at options to improve environmental sustainability, to make 
the farm sector more innovative, and to revitalise rural areas so as to ensure that farming remains 
an attractive option for young people in future years. Reforms to improve how agricultural markets 
function are also part of the new vision that Beijing has set out in this area, and again echo aspects 
of the Agenda 2030 framework—which for example commits to “correcting and preventing distor-
tions in world agricultural markets” as part of the goal of ending hunger, achieving food security 
and improved nutrition, and promoting sustainable agriculture.
The Chinese government has, in recent years, initiated a number of reforms to the country’s food 
and agricultural policies, with a view to improving the market orientation of the agricultural sector 
and achieving a number of broader public policy goals. These reforms have included new policies 
on cotton, rapeseed and maize in particular. They have been designed to reduce the fiscal burden 
associated with previous policies on public procurement and stockpiling for key farm products, 
especially in the context of falling international commodity prices, and taking into consideration 
the relatively low market access barriers that China agreed to as part of its WTO accession commit-
ments.
This paper, by Wusheng Yu, explores the implications of recent reforms for prices, production and 
trade for a set of five key agricultural products, and looks at how different scenarios could affect 
both domestic and international markets. As such, we hope that it represents a useful contribution 
to the ongoing debate over how farm policy reforms in key farm importing and exporting countries 
could support efforts to move towards a more equitable and sustainable global food system.
Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz 
Chief Executive, ICTSD
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
China’s efforts to secure self-sufficiency in grains and other important agricultural products have 
resulted in continuously rising domestic agricultural outputs; however, recent rises in domestic 
outputs have been associated with higher domestic market costs and prices as compared to 
the corresponding world market prices, which has led to higher (and rising) imports and, more 
seriously, high domestic stocks of major agricultural products at significant storage costs. The 
coexistence of high domestic outputs, high imports, and high domestic stock, dubbed the “triple-
high” phenomenon in agricultural policy debates in China, is a major challenge facing Chinese 
policy makers, not only because of the ballooning fiscal costs associated with this phenomenon but 
also due to the compatibility of the country’s agricultural domestic support with its World Trade 
Organization (WTO) commitments. Moreover, the rising pressure to import more food grains is not 
consistent with the country’s long-held goal of high self-sufficiency rates.
In responding to this unprecedented situation, the Chinese central government announced that 
its farm policy would be modernised, with a gradual movement towards more market-oriented 
policies and more differentiated policies on different commodities. For rice and wheat, the 
minimum procurement prices are to be maintained and “perfected;” for cotton (mainly in the 
Xinjiang region) and soybean in Northeast China, the new target price systems are to be further 
implemented so that compensation payments will be made to farmers when market prices fall short 
of the declared target price. This replaces the government procurement and stockpiling programme 
responsible for the large stockholding; for maize, the procurement and stockpiling policy was also 
formally repealed and replaced by market pricing and producer subsidies, the latter of which is to 
be formally delinked from maize price formation. For all five products considered in this paper, the 
Chinese central government declared (see CCCPC and State Council of China 2016) that the size of 
state reserve stocks needs to be “scientifically” determined and that stock build-up and release 
mechanisms are to be “perfected.”
Whether and to what extent these farm policy reforms will be able to alleviate the symptoms of the 
“triple-high” phenomenon has tremendous implications for not only the Chinese agriculture sector 
and related upstream and downstream industries (e.g. input producers and processors) but also for 
global agricultural markets and trade. The purpose of this paper is therefore to provide an initial 
analysis of the above-mentioned policy changes in China, focusing on the likely implications of its 
recent policy reforms for production, domestic stock and trade in relation to grains (rice, wheat, 
maize and soybean) and cotton, as well as the potential implications of further policy options 
affecting the markets of these products. Such an analysis—based on detailed data analysis and 
descriptions of most recent policy developments and where possible drawn from recent literature—
should be useful for relevant policy audiences to understand the trade and market effects of China’s 
recent policy development and future directions in relation to policy goals of food security and 
sustainable development.
For rice and wheat, maintaining or effectively reducing minimum prices (as the main policy 
instrument recently used by China) would help curb the rising market price support for these two 
products. Additionally, if the new strategy presented in the 2016 Policy Document no. 1 of “using 
domestic and international resources and utilizing domestic and international markets” covers these 
two products, then a more open attitude to their imports may also be expected, which may result 
in full utilisation of the rice and wheat import quotas. It is also possible that China may temporarily 
withdraw marginally productive land from active production through new land management plans. 
Lastly, recent consolidation of various direct payments into the single agricultural support payment 
seems to further decouple these payments from actual production and input use decisions and has 
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the potential to reduce its distortionary effects; and the delinking of these payments from various 
inputs could be a signal to limit future rise of these payments in the face of increasing input prices.
In the case of cotton and soybean, the most notable change is the implementation of the target 
price system. This change is more significant for cotton than for soybean, as the “triple-high” 
symptom is most evident for the former product. By applying a target price that is set at a lower 
level and by repealing stockpiling, it is understandable that the target price system for cotton 
implies smaller government spending on supporting production, in addition to the savings from 
not having to increase its already sizable stockholding. Nevertheless, the target price system—
as a price-based intervention instrument—will still expose the Chinese government to uncertain 
compensation spending arising from price fluctuations. In particular, relative decreases in the world 
market price would lead to rising compensation spending under the target price system; to avoid 
such an outcome, trade policy coordination in the form of increases in the sliding scale tariff rate 
or tightening the supplementary quota may be needed. On the reverse side, a rising world market 
price, while helpful in controlling compensation spending, can be similarly troublesome due to the 
need to control the impact on China’s textile and apparel industry. In that case, reductions of the 
sliding scale tariff of cotton or effective expansion of the cotton quota may be needed. Of course, 
adjustment of the target price itself could be another option, although this would require prior 
announcement for purposes of maintaining the credibility of the system itself.
The pilot target price system for soybean, on the other hand, likely poses smaller uncertainties in 
relation to government budgetary considerations and market outcomes. The reason is that domestic 
production of soybean is relatively small compared to its domestic consumption, and import tariff 
barriers are almost non-existent. Therefore, it is expected that the target price system will not 
generate drastically different market outcomes.
Among the four major grains, maize is perhaps the one that is currently undergoing the largest policy 
adjustment as maize policy transitions to “market procurement” and direct producer subsidies. 
While the exact details of the new system have yet to emerge, it is clear that dealing with the 
huge stock (estimated to be as high as 250 million tons) and ever increasing planting area is the top 
priority. In the short run, such adjustment would not necessarily lead to larger imports into China 
because initial spending on producer subsidies is expected to be substantial enough to moderate 
the shocks to producers and the domestic market. In the longer term, reduced outputs and planting 
areas are expected. After these domestic adjustments and as maize stock returns to lower and 
stable levels, it is possible that China would start to import more.
Moving away from costly policy instruments is a very positive development towards reducing 
swelling government stocks and controlling expansions of high-cost domestic production, which 
would also be beneficial in terms of sustainable development in agriculture. Regardless of whether 
these changes would lead to an immediate rise in imports, it is expected that they would lead 
to lower levels of market price support which would improve China’s position in relation to its 
WTO agricultural domestic support commitments. On the other hand, whether China is truly fully 
embracing the recently declared strategy to “rely on both domestic and international markets 
and resources” to realise grain security still remains to be seen, as the decoupling between price 
formation and income/subsidy transfer roles of the new policy instruments remains incomplete.
The consolidated direct domestic subsidies can be another major positive step in China’s farm policy 
reform, if such payments are totally delinked from considerations of input price changes, are given on 
a per unit of land basis and become uniform across Chinese regions and across different commodities. 
In that case, these direct payments will have minimal production and trade distortion effects, thereby 
improving China’s position in relation to its WTO agricultural domestic support commitments.
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In the long run, assuming continually rising costs (especially labour costs) in Chinese agriculture, 
the implied further declining comparative advantages in agriculture, particularly in land-intensive 
products such as grains, suggest a sustained fundamental conflict between the pursuit of high self-
sufficiency ratios in grains and other important agricultural commodities and the constraints on 
government assistance to agriculture imposed by China’s fiscal resources and by its commitments 
at the WTO. Direct government interventions using market price tools and stockpiling have proven 
costly and inefficient in recent years, as well as causing complaints from China’s trading partners 
on exceeding its WTO support ceilings. In view of this long-run consideration, recent policy reforms 
should be considered as interim steps to alleviate the immediate concerns, whereas longer-term 
solutions in view of sustainable development would require further farm policy reforms such as 
possibly converting current market price support into true income transfers.
x
1Agriculture
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, agricultural 
production has increased notably in China, 
sparked in part by government policies to promote 
self-sufficiency in grains. But as production 
has increased, so has government stockpiling. 
For instance, China’s rice and wheat stocks are 
estimated to have been about 160 million tons 
by 2015; its maize stock at the end of the 2016 
crop year is expected to reach 113 million tons, 
representing over half of the world supply; and 
its cotton stock was nearly twice as much as its 
domestic consumption in 2014 (USDA PSD online).1 
In connection with rising grain and cotton 
stockpiles, the price differentiation between 
domestic and international market prices has 
also increased, leading to increased pressure to 
import more (see e.g. Gale et al. 2014). Support 
prices for commodities such as maize, wheat and 
rice have resulted in large stocks and suppressed 
demand, especially industry/processing demand, 
with some estimates indicating the country’s 
policies have artificially increased domestic 
grain prices by 30 percent or more above the 
price of imported grains (see e.g. OECD 2016). 
The coexistence of high and growing domestic 
production, high and increasing imports and high 
and rising domestic stockholding is commonly 
referred to as the “triple-high” phenomenon in 
domestic agricultural policy discussion in China 
(see e.g. People’s Daily 2016 and Zhu 2015). 
Despite the ability to maintain the food self-
sufficiency targets, the ballooning fiscal costs 
associated with the “triple-high” phenomenon 
are certainly unsettling for Chinese policy makers. 
At the same time, China’s increased spending on 
agricultural support could have implications for 
the country’s compliance with its World Trade 
Organization (WTO) commitments in agriculture, 
such as limits on trade-distorting agricultural 
domestic support and import restrictions, and 
could potentially influence the country’s position 
in multilateral trade negotiations.
In responding to this unprecedented situation, 
in the country’s annual government white paper 
such as the recent No. 1 documents (CCCPC and 
State Council of China 2015 and 2016) the Chinese 
central government announced that its farm policy 
would be modernised, with a gradual movement 
towards more market-oriented policies and more 
differentiated policies on different commodities. 
For rice and wheat, the minimum procurement 
prices are to be maintained and “perfected;” 
for cotton (mainly in the Xinjiang region) and 
soybean in Northeast China, the new target price 
systems are to be further implemented so that 
compensation payments will be made to farmers 
when market prices fall short of the declared 
target price. This replaces the government 
procurement and stockpiling programme 
responsible for the large stockholding; for maize, 
the procurement and stockpiling policy was 
also formally repealed and replaced by market 
pricing and producer subsidies which are to be 
formally delinked from each other, as reported 
on the website of the Ministry of Finance on 20 
June 20162. For all five products, the government 
has declared that the size of state reserve stocks 
needs to be “scientifically” determined and that 
stock build-up and release mechanism are to be 
“perfected.”
Whether and to what extent these farm policy 
reforms will be able to alleviate the symptoms of 
the “triple-high” phenomenon has tremendous 
implications not only for the Chinese agriculture 
sector but also for global agricultural markets 
and trade. The former point is self-explanatory: 
the high fiscal costs of supporting the current 
levels of production and stocks make changes of 
course necessary in the short run; in the longer 
run, how to make use of its agricultural resource 
in a sustainable manner while ensuring long term 
food security is of paramount importance to 
Chinese policy makers, as China is also dealing 
1 Systematically gathered official stock data from China are not available but alternative unofficial estimates exist. For 
example, a report which appeared on the 21st Century Economic Report (21世纪经济报道) suggests China’s maize stock 
to be around 250 million tons, which is more than twice the size of the USDA estimate (source: http://finance.sina.
com.cn/roll/2016-03-29/doc-ifxqsxic3509126.shtml, accessed 12 November 2016).
2 www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caijingshidian/zgxww/201606/t20160620_2332612.html, accessed 8 January 2017.
2with challenges to its agricultural resource base 
such as water pollution and shortage and land 
degradation arising from current agricultural 
practices. Globally, how the new policies 
influence China’s domestic production and 
stockholding will have implications for China’s 
imports from its trading partners. Due to the 
dominant positions of China in these markets 
in terms of production, consumption and trade, 
any significant changes in production or stock 
levels in these products will be transmitted to 
the world market through changing trade flows 
as well as through changed world market prices. 
As China transitions from a net agricultural 
exporting country at the time of joining the 
WTO to an important net agricultural importing 
country today, its long-term policy orientation 
will also help shape the world agricultural 
trading system.
To ensure that trade negotiators and other 
relevant policy actors are able to draw on an 
informed assessment of the likely implications 
of China’s recent and upcoming policy reforms, 
and with a view to informing policymaking that 
will enhance food security and sustainable 
development, the purpose of this paper is 
to provide an initial analysis of recent and 
upcoming agricultural policy changes in China, 
focusing on the likely implications of China’s 
recent policy reforms for production, domestic 
stock and trade in relation to grains (rice, wheat, 
maize and soybean) and cotton, as well as the 
potential implications of further policy options 
affecting markets for these products.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next 
section, recent trends in China’s agricultural 
production, trade and price development 
are reviewed to characterise the unsettling 
“triple-high” phenomenon within the Chinese 
agricultural sector. Section three provides a 
description of China’s agricultural policy and its 
main instruments concerning grains and cotton 
and presents recent agricultural policy reforms 
for these products. In section four, detailed 
analysis of the production and trade effects of 
recent policy reforms and future policy options 
for each of the five products are provided. 
Section five synthesises the major findings of 
the paper, evaluates the overall policy trends in 
China’s agricultural sectors and discusses China’s 
overall agricultural trade policy options and the 
uncertainties associated with these options.
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2. RECENT TRENDS IN CHINA’S AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 
TRADE PATTERNS AND PRICE DEVELOPMENT
This section provides a review of recent 
production and trade trends of major 
agricultural commodities in China (including 
rice, wheat, soybean, as well as maize and 
cotton) and characterises the phenomenon 
of rising production at high production costs 
and rising domestic prices, high government 
stockholding of key commodities, and high 
and rising imports, known as the “triple-high” 
phenomenon intensively debated in China (see 
for example People’s Daily 2016).
2.1. Rising Production of Rice, Wheat and 
Maize and Stagnating Production of 
Soybean and Cotton
China’s grain security has been assured in 
the past decades mainly through consistent 
output growth in rice, wheat and maize for 
all years since 2005 (see Figures 1–5; detailed 
data  sourced from USDA PSD online database 
are compiled in Appendix Table A). During the 
2005–2015 period, the combined outputs of 
rice, wheat and maize have increased from 
363.2 to 500.5 million tons, representing an 
increase of nearly 38 percent. Expansion 
of grain outputs has been most visible for 
maize (from 139.4 to 224.6 million tons, or an 
increase of 61.1 percent), followed by wheat 
(from 97.4 to 130.2 million tons, representing a 
33.6 percent increase) and rice (from 126.4 to 
145.8 million tons, representing a 15.3 percent 
increase). Compared to China’s large domestic 
outputs in rice, wheat and maize, the country’s 
imports and exports of these products have 
been relatively modest. As shown in Figure 1, 
China had some net exports of rice initially, 
but became a net importer in 2010 and has 
since increased its net imports, eventually 
reaching the level of 4.7 million tons of net 
imports in 2015 (see also Appendix Table A). 
For wheat, China’s status as a net exporter 
lasted until 2008 and has since changed to that 
of a net importer, with peak net imports being 
reached in 2013 at 5.9 million tons (see Figure 
2). In the case of maize, China was initially a 
significant net exporter, having exported as 
much as 15.2 million tons in 2002; however, 
in more recent years, China has also become 
a net maize importer (see Figure 5). Overall, 
although rising domestic outputs of rice, 
wheat and maize have successfully limited 
the extent of imports of these products and 
resulted in very high levels of self-sufficiency 
ratios, it is also evident that China became 
a net importer around 2009–2010 as imports 
started to surge.
In contrast to the rising trend of rice, wheat 
and maize production, China’s soybean and 
cotton production has been either on a 
downward trend or has stagnated in the past 
decade (see Figures 3 and 4). Soybean, which 
is also considered a food grain in China,3 has 
experienced a gradual output decline from 
16.4 million tons in 2005 to 11.6 million tons 
in 2015, despite a rapid surge in domestic 
consumption. The shortage in domestic 
soybean supply has been met with a massive 
surge of imports, which already amounted to 
28.3 million tons in 2005 and reached the level 
of 82.4 million tons in 2015, positioning China 
as the world’s dominant soybean importer. It 
is quite apparent that even though soybean 
is listed as a food grain in China, the same 
stringent self-sufficiency requirement has not 
been imposed on this product.
In the case of cotton, China is among the 
world’s most important producers and 
importers. China’s domestic production 
increased from 4.4 million tons in 2000 to the 
peak level of 8.1 million tons in 2007; after 
that, domestic cotton production levelled off 
until 2010, before rebounding during the 2011–
2013 period, and finally dropped quite sharply 
in 2015 to only 4.8 million tons (Figure 3). 
During the same period, China has imported 
sizable amounts of cotton, particularly during 
the periods of 2005–2007 and 2009–2013, 
3 Soybean production is included in the official statistics of total food grain production in China. See classification used 
in the Chinese Statistics Yearbooks (www.stats.gov.cn).
4when cotton imports amounted to between 30 
percent and 70 percent of domestic outputs in 
those years respectively (see Figure 3).
2.2. Rising Domestic Stockholding
Maintaining high levels of domestic stocks of 
grains and other commodities of importance has 
been part of China’s food security strategy. In 
the early 2000s, according to estimates from the 
USDA PSD online database (see Appendix Table 
A), China’s stock-to-use ratios for rice, wheat 
and maize have been mostly between 25 and 
40 percent, with wheat stock being higher than 
that of rice and maize. During the 2013–2015 
period, however, there has been a quick build-
up of domestic stocks of these commodities, 
resulting in notably higher stock-to-use ratios. 
For instance, China’s rice stock in 2015 was 
estimated to be 63.2 million tons, equivalent 
to 44 percent of its domestic use for that 
year; similarly, maize stock in 2015 was 110.7 
million tons, about half of its domestic use and 
domestic production. For wheat, domestic stock 
was similarly high in 2015 at around 97 million 
tons, representing 87 percent of its domestic 
use. The situation for soybean is quite different, 
as domestic production has been on a decline 
and imports have become the main source of 
China’s total domestic supply. In the past few 
years, China’s soybean stock-to-use ratio has 
stabilised at between 17 and 22 percent.
These seemingly excessively high levels of 
domestic stocks are certainly reflective of 
continuous growth of domestic production, as 
discussed earlier. What is interesting is that 
these large domestic stocks in the last three 
years have been accumulated at a time when 
China has increasingly become a net importer 
of these products, possibly suggesting that 
large portions of rising domestic production 
have entered the state reserve stocks as 
they were not as competitively priced as the 
rising imports sourced from world markets. 
Regardless of the reasons, maintaining such a 
high stock level places a heavy fiscal burden 
on the Chinese government and managing 
these stocks has become a pressing concern.
For cotton, there has also been a very large 
build-up of domestic stock during the last four 
years. Higher levels of domestic production, 
coupled with substantial amount of imports, 
have resulted in a sudden jump in cotton 
stockholding in 2011, which continued until 
2014 when domestic stock approached 14.6 
million tons, equivalent to almost twice the 
size of China’s domestic use in that year. 
In 2015, domestic production was notably 
lower and imports also receded, resulting in 
a drawdown of domestic stock by nearly 2 
million tons. Still, this represents an estimated 
stock-to-use ratio of 166 percent.
To sum up, out of the five products covered in 
this study, four have experienced large surges 
of domestic stockholding over recent years, 
aided by increased domestic production and 
also increased imports.
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Figure 1: Rice: rising production, increasing stock and rising net imports
Figure 2: Wheat: rising production, increasing stock and rising net imports
Source: USDA PSD online. 
Note: numbers are in 1,000 tons. TY imports and TY exports refer to imports and exports in trade years (TY), respectively.
Source: USDA PSD online. 
Note: numbers are in 1,000 tons. TY imports and TY exports refer to imports and exports in trade years, respectively.
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6Figure 3: Cotton: stagnating production and sharply rising stock
Figure 4: Soybean: China as the world’s dominant importer due to rising consumption
Source: USDA PSD online. 
Note: numbers are in 1,000 tons.
Source: USDA PSD online. 
Note: numbers are in 1,000 tons.
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Figure 5: Maize: rising production and increasing imports leading to large stock
Source: USDA PSD online. 
Note: numbers are in 1,000 tons. TY imports and TY exports refer to imports and exports in trade years, respectively.
2.3. Widening Domestic–World  
Market Price Gaps
To make sense of the coexistence of growing 
domestic stocks and rising imports, it is 
worthwhile to review the domestic and world 
market price movements during the past 
decade for the five products, as presented 
in Table 1 and illustrated in Figures 6–10, 
based on data from the World Bank, China 
Agricultural Price Survey Yearbooks and 
National Compilation of Cost and Revenue in 
Agricultural Production.
Measured in current US dollars, domestic rice 
prices in China increased consistently during 
the 2002–2015 period, having risen from 0.23 
US$/kg in 2002 to 0.87 US$/kg in 2015; while 
during the same period, the world market 
price initially increased from 0.19 US$/kg 
in 2003 to the peak level of 0.65 US$/kg in 
2008, before receding to 0.39 US$/kg in 2015. 
As such, China’s domestic price was already 
higher in 2002 than the corresponding world 
market price by about 20 percent; however, 
this difference was reversed for the 2008–2009 
period when world market prices spiked as 
part of the world food price crisis; since then, 
the Chinese domestic price premium continued 
and widened, particularly during 2013–2015 
due to rising Chinese prices and lower world 
market prices. In 2015, the domestic price 
of rice in China was more than twice as high 
as the corresponding world market price, a 
development that explains rising imports and 
growing rice stocks.
Similarly, domestic prices for wheat in China 
also experienced consistent increases, starting 
from 0.12 US$/kg in 2000 and reaching the level 
of 0.42 US$/kg in 2014. From 2000 to 2008, 
these domestic prices were not too different 
from the corresponding world market prices; 
however, after 2008, as world market prices 
fell and relatively stabilised, rising domestic 
prices in China led to widening price gaps 
which in 2015 saw domestic prices in China 
being about 100 percent higher.
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8Rice Wheat Maize
Domestic World
Domestic 
/world 
ratio
Domestic World
Domestic 
/world 
ratio
Domestic World
Domestic 
/world 
ratio
2000 - 0.20 - 0.12 0.11 1.08 0.11 0.09 1.20 
2001 - 0.17 - 0.13 0.13 1.04 0.13 0.09 1.45 
2002 0.23 0.19 1.21 0.13 0.15 0.86 0.12 0.10 1.25 
2003 0.24 0.20 1.23 0.14 0.15 0.94 0.14 0.11 1.30 
2004 0.34 0.24 1.44 0.18 0.16 1.17 0.17 0.11 1.51 
2005 0.36 0.29 1.25 0.18 0.15 1.21 0.16 0.10 1.61 
2006 0.38 0.30 1.25 0.18 0.19 0.96 0.17 0.12 1.40 
2007 0.43 0.33 1.30 0.21 0.26 0.82 0.21 0.16 1.26 
2008 0.49 0.65 0.75 0.26 0.33 0.79 0.25 0.22 1.12 
2009 0.53 0.55 0.96 0.28 0.22 1.26 0.26 0.17 1.55 
2010 0.62 0.49 1.28 0.30 0.22 1.36 0.30 0.19 1.62 
2011 0.74 0.54 1.36 0.35 0.32 1.10 0.35 0.29 1.20 
2012 0.80 0.56 1.43 0.37 0.31 1.19 0.38 0.30 1.27 
2013 0.84 0.51 1.66 0.40 0.31 1.29 0.39 0.26 1.49 
2014 0.87 0.42 2.05 0.42 0.28 1.48 0.40 0.19 2.10 
2015 0.87 0.39 2.23 0.40 0.20 2.00 0.38 0.17 2.24
Soybean Cotton
Domestic World
Domestic 
/world 
ratio
Domestic World
Domestic 
/world 
ratio
2000 0.30 0.21 1.44 1.25 1.30 0.96 
2001 0.29 0.20 1.50 0.91 1.06 0.86 
2002 0.29 0.21 1.35 1.16 1.02 1.13 
2003 0.36 0.26 1.35 1.80 1.40 1.29 
2004 0.47 0.31 1.53 1.32 1.37 0.96 
2005 0.44 0.27 1.59 1.60 1.22 1.31 
2006 0.44 0.27 1.62 1.52 1.27 1.20 
2007 0.54 0.38 1.40 1.75 1.40 1.25 
2008 0.80 0.52 1.53 1.50 1.57 0.96 
2009 0.71 0.44 1.63 1.95 1.38 1.41 
2010 0.76 0.45 1.70 3.66 2.28 1.60 
2011 0.86 0.54 1.59 2.79 3.33 0.84 
2012 0.93 0.59 1.57 2.89 1.97 1.47 
2013 1.00 0.54 1.87 3.01 1.99 1.51 
2014 1.03 0.49 2.10 2.77 1.83 1.51 
2015 0.99 0.39 2.54 1.75 1.55 1.13 
Table 1. Domestic and world market prices for major commodities (USD/kg; annual average)
Sources: domestic prices (except for cotton) are sourced from China Agricultural Price Survey Yearbooks (中国农产品价格调
查年鉴). World market prices are from World Bank. For cotton, domestic prices are the farm gate prices as reflected in the 
Producer Support Estimates (PSE) table of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
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For maize and soybean, despite their very 
different trade orientations, domestic prices 
in China have been consistently higher than the 
corresponding world market prices. By 2015, 
domestic prices of both products were more 
than doubling the corresponding world market 
prices. In the case of cotton, except for 2004, 
2008 and 2011, farm gate prices in China have 
been higher than the corresponding world 
market prices, and during 2012–2014 domestic 
farm gate prices were about 40 percent to 
50 percent higher. In 2015, however, China’s 
cotton notably dipped so that the domestic–
world market price difference also reduced.
2.4. Summary
The consistent increases in Chinese domestic 
prices have been a universal phenomenon for 
most of the products covered in this analysis. 
These rising prices have generally diminished 
the international competitiveness of these 
products, thereby creating ever-increasing 
pressure for China to import more. However, as 
will be discussed in the next section, increasing 
domestic agricultural support and border 
protection policies have generally maintained 
producers’ incentive for production and have 
helped maintain a steady output growth, 
particularly for rice, wheat and maize. Due to 
the widening gaps between domestic and world 
market prices, this has increasingly resulted in 
large amount of grains and other commodities 
being put in public stocks. Growing stockpiling 
has prompted policy makers in China to rethink 
their agricultural policy. In the next section, 
a review of China’s agricultural policy and its 
recent development is provided.
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3.1. Overview of China’s Domestic Support 
Programme
China’s current domestic support and 
market price support system focuses on 
grain production but also covers other crops 
such as cotton, oil seeds and sugar. It mainly 
includes direct payments attached to either 
contracted or actually planted land,4 subsidies 
to specific inputs and market price support 
in the form of minimum purchase prices, and 
more recently pilot projects of the target 
price system. Price-based instruments are 
sometimes tied to other forms of government 
interventions such as procurement and ad 
hoc interventions, which are often backed 
by government stockholding. Together with 
trade policy instruments implemented at the 
border, such as import tariff and tariff rate 
quotas, these policy instruments are designed 
for maintaining producers’ incentives for 
production, stabilising prices and enhancing 
farm incomes.
The most comprehensive, regularly maintained 
and updated and publicly available data source 
on China’s agricultural domestic support is the 
Producer Support Estimates (PSE) compiled 
by the OECD. Table 2 presents China’s total 
PSE estimates during the 2006–2015 period, 
as well as a breakdown of relevant policy 
instruments/programmes. China’s total PSE is 
estimated to be ¥435 billion in 2006 and has 
since been on a general upward trend (except 
in 2008 when rising world food prices resulted 
in negative market price support for China in 
that year), reaching the level of ¥1,931 billion 
in 2015. Measured as a percentage of its total 
gross farm receipts, China’s PSE rose from 12.4 
percent in 2006 to 21.3 percent in 2015, thus 
exceeding the average level of percentage 
PSE in the OECD countries (at 17.1 percent). 
In comparison, the same measure for the EU, 
US and Japan in 2015 was respectively 9.4 
percent, 18.9 percent and 43.1 percent.
In most years, the bulk of China’s total PSE 
is the so-called market price support (MPS), 
which for each commodity is calculated as the 
product of the gap between domestic and world 
market prices and the quantity of production 
for that product. As domestic prices in China 
have been on an uninterrupted upward trend, 
the gap between domestic and world market 
prices has widened, especially in more recent 
years, resulting in increasing market price 
support. In reality, increasing market price 
support due to rising gaps between domestic 
and world market prices and rising domestic 
production reflects higher government 
assistance to agricultural production. 
This assistance is provided through policy 
instruments such as import protection realised 
through import tariffs and tariff rate quotas 
and the various domestic price interventions 
and government stockholding.
Other important elements of China’s producer 
support estimates include various direct 
payments either based on input use or on 
current planting areas that require production 
in order to be eligible for support payments. 
As relevant to the products covered in the 
current analysis, this includes insurance fee 
subsidies for crops, direct payments to grain 
farmers, comprehensive agricultural subsidies 
and new variety extension payments, among 
other programmes. More recently, pilot 
projects on the so-called target price system 
were initiated to replace the temporary 
stockholding programme for cotton. This 
programme also extended partially to soybean 
producers in Northeast China. Finally, a 
consolidated agricultural support payment 
was introduced to replace the three direct 
subsidies mentioned above.
3. RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S AGRICULTURAL POLICY
4 Rural land in China is owned collectively while individual farmers hold long-term leases/contracts to use collectively 
owned farm land. Certain agricultural subsidies in China are distributed to individual farmers on the basis of either 
contracted land or actually planted land area, the latter of which requires much higher implementation costs due to 
the possibility that farmers may choose to let their contract land idle.
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3.2. China’s Domestic Market Price Support 
Instruments
China’s domestic market price-based policy 
instruments and the embodied government 
assistance typically differ from one commodity 
to another. In the case of rice and wheat, 
the minimum procurement prices set by the 
government and announced by the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
are used to regulate these markets (see 
discussions in OECD 2016, as well as in ICTSD 
2016c). When rice and wheat market prices 
fall below these minimum prices, government 
intervention purchases are triggered so as to 
provide support to producers. On the converse 
side, government-held stock of rice and wheat 
is auctioned when market prices are high or 
when market supply is tight relative to demand. 
For a few other products including maize, 
soybean and cotton, temporary purchases for 
government stocks have also been conducted 
at government-administered prices, for 
encouraging production and domestic supply. 
The level and extent of assistance provided 
through combinations of these price and 
storage mechanisms depend not only on the 
domestic market situation but also on the 
world market price situation. Therefore, 
these domestic instruments are also used in 
coordination with trade policy instruments to 
ensure the desired domestic market outcomes.
According to the PSE estimates (Table 2), 
China’s MPS for rice was initially negative 
during 2006–2011 due to lower domestic 
prices but turned positive thereafter and has 
since increased rapidly to the level of ¥232 
billion, or nearly 40 percent of China’s rice 
production value (at farm gate price) in 2015. 
In the case of wheat, the increase in MPS is 
more steady and gradual but still reached 
¥111 billion in 2015, or about 35 percent of 
wheat production value for that year. For 
maize, the temporary stockholding policy in 
recent years has resulted in large spikes of 
MPS during 2013–2015, with maize MPS in 2015 
being nearly three times as high as in 2012. 
The situation of soybean appears to be better, 
as soybean MPS has been much smaller due to 
lower domestic production and much greater 
trade openness. Similarly, cotton was subject 
to the temporary stockpiling policy during 
the 2011–2014 period and cotton MPS as a 
percentage of its production value was as high 
as 58 percent in 2010. The historically high 
world market price of cotton in 2011 reduced 
cotton MPS to 10 percent, but receding world 
market prices thereafter and rising domestic 
prices again pushed cotton MPS to high levels 
in more recent years.
The steadily growing domestic outputs of rice, 
wheat and maize,5 as shown in Figures 1, 2 and 
5, as well in Appendix Table A, are certainly 
indicative of the contemporaneous effects of 
these high levels of MPS, which themselves 
were due to government interventions and 
world market price movements. For instance, 
import barriers such as tariffs or quotas 
typically raise domestic market prices above 
the corresponding world market prices, 
thereby encouraging domestic production at 
the expense of reduced imports. As increasing 
domestic outputs of these products are 
supported by the MPS for these products 
and their prices are held artificially high, it 
is not always the case that all the outputs 
can be consumed domestically in the same 
year. Indeed, as shown in Appendix Table A, 
much of the increased outputs (particularly 
those in the more recent years supported 
by higher MPS) entered into public stocks. 
As a matter of fact, temporary stockholding 
was an integral component of the market 
price-based programmes for all five products 
considered in this study at various points of 
time in the past decade. Therefore, the costs 
of these MPS programmes are larger than the 
direct contemporaneous fiscal costs, when 
considering warehousing costs and other 
related costs for holding these stocks.
5 In the case of cotton, outputs would also be lower in the absence of the MPS.
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3.3. China’s Agricultural Trade Policy
China’s agricultural domestic support 
instruments are often used in conjunction 
with border measures such as import tariff 
and tariff rate quotas to help maintain 
desirable domestic market prices and targeted 
domestic self-sufficiency ratios for important 
agricultural products such as rice and wheat. 
As part of China’s WTO accession agreement 
in 2001, rice, wheat, maize, sugar, wool and 
cotton are all subject to the Tariff Rate Quota 
(TRQ) system, with high out-quota tariff rates 
and low in-quota tariff rates (see Table 3). For 
rice, the final quota implemented in 2004 is 
2.66 million tons for both short and medium 
grain rice and for long grain rice, with imports 
within these quotas receiving the low tariff of 
1 percent and imports outside these quotas 
receiving the high tariff of 65 percent. These 
in-quota and out-quota tariffs are the same 
for wheat and maize; however, final quotas 
for wheat and maize are set at higher levels, 
at 9.636 million tons and 7.2 million tons 
respectively. For cotton, the quota level is set 
at a relatively low level (0.894 million tons 
from 2004 onwards) as compared to recent 
import quantities. The out-quota cotton tariff 
is set at 40 percent.6 The notable omission 
from the TRQ coverage is soybean, which only 
faces an import tariff and has been imported 
in large quantities by China since its WTO 
accession in 2001.
Imports of rice, wheat and maize in recent 
years have not exceeded their respective 
final quotas and therefore the high out-quota 
tariffs of 65 percent have yet to be triggered. 
However, judging from the recent rising trends 
of imports (see Table 1), it is possible that in 
the future these quotas may be exceeded and 
the high out-quota tariff rates may apply. For 
cotton, the import quota has already been 
exceeded for all years since 2003. Instead 
of charging the high out-quota tariff of 40 
percent, the Chinese government instead 
installed a sliding-scale tariff between 0 and 
40 percent on over-quota imports, and for 
some years also added a supplementary import 
quota, thereby effectively reducing import 
protection on cotton.
3.4. China’s Domestic Agricultural Subsidies
The first direct payment to agriculture 
introduced by the Chinese government since 
the abolition of agricultural taxation was that 
for grain production. This payment has been 
distributed according to either contracted, 
registered or actual planted areas of land, 
typically in the range of ¥10–15 per mu (see Yu 
and Jensen 2010).7 The total national spending 
on this subsidy has been kept quite stable in 
recent years at ¥15.1 billion per year (Table 2).
The other main direct payment is the so-
called “comprehensive subsidy on agricultural 
inputs,” intended to reduce the cost to 
farmers of purchasing agricultural inputs such 
as fertilisers, fuels, pesticides and plastic 
films. Spending on this central government-
funded subsidy programme had increased quite 
rapidly in its first years of existence, especially 
when grain prices and energy prices (hence 
agricultural input prices) were at very high 
levels, reflecting the government’s intention 
to use this subsidy to offset the rising input 
costs for farmers at national level. In fact, 
the central government followed a “dynamic 
adjustment system” that ties the changes in 
fertiliser, diesel and other agricultural input 
prices to the amount of overall spending on this 
subsidy programme. Therefore, at the national 
level this subsidy has indeed been tied to input 
prices (see discussions in e.g. Yu and Jensen 
2014). However, at farm household level, the 
subsidy has been dispensed as a payment per 
unit of land, thereby seemingly making it an 
income transfer to individual farm households. 
In the more recent years, the total spending 
on this subsidy has stabilised and by the end of 
2014, the central government allocated around 
¥107.1 billion to this subsidy, roughly the same 
amount as in the immediately preceding years.
6 According to ICTSD 2016a, China is the only major cotton importer that imposes tariffs or quotas on cotton imports.
7 1 mu =666.667 square meters (or 1 hectare = 15 mu).
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Improved seed variety subsidy is another 
major input-based support policy that is 
implemented either as a direct payment per 
unit of land (for rice, maize and rapeseeds) 
or through direct payments or reduced 
seed prices that are decided by provincial 
governments (for wheat, soybean and 
cotton). In 2014, the spending on this subsidy 
amounted to ¥21.4 billion.
A fourth type of subsidy concerns the purchase 
of agricultural machinery, which is available 
to both individual farmers and agricultural 
operation entities such as specialised 
mechanisation providers when they purchase 
agriculture machinery. In 2015, buyers of 11 
categories (including 43 sub-categories) of 
agricultural machinery can effectively receive 
a 30 percent subsidy of the purchase prices. In 
addition, provinces included in the National 
Agricultural Mechanisation Implementation 
Plan for Subsoiling and Cultivating Operation 
can provide subsidies to these operations. In 
total, this programme cost the government 
¥21.8 billion in 2013. In 2015, subsidies were 
also planned for renewing and replacing 
existing agricultural machinery, although the 
budgetary outlays are not publically available.
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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Producer Support Estimate 
(PSE)
435,915 437,037 138,989 617,602 920,558
Market Price Support 243,872 193,700 -93,032 343,165 681,490
Wheat MPS 78,587 55,270 64,533 65,167 64,404
Maize MPS 43,587 32,898 -36,120 40,476 49,986
Rice MPS -11,193 -2,310 -240,358 -168,580 -2,301
Soybeans MPS 5,925 3,730 -4,668 12,211 10,063
Cotton MPS 33,427 44,435 10,642 45,761 86,104
Payments based on input 
use
122,341 148,136 82,397 115,495 87,394
Insurance fees subsidy 
for crops and livestock 
commodities
0 0 0 0 11,125
Fixed capital formation 50,865 60,289 57,455 83,725 57,940
Payments based on 
current A/An/R/I, 
production required
48,474 72,624 120,531 123,435 117,770
Direct payments to grain 
farmers
14,200 15,100 15,100 15,100 15,100
Agricultural input 
comprehensive subsidies
12,000 27,600 71,800 79,500 72,472
New Variety Extension 
Payment 2006–12 - Crops
3,970 6,380 9,855 17,440 20,400
Target price payments 
(Cotton)
0 0 0 0 0
Target price payments 
(Soybean)
0 0 0 0 0
Agricultural support 
payments
0 0 0 0 0
Percentage PSE (percent) 12 10 3 12 15
Table 2. China’s Producer Support Estimates for major commodities2006–2015 (million CNY)
15Agriculture
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Producer Support Estimate 
(PSE)
729,880 1,382,687 1,621,984 1,697,605 1,931,653
Market Price Support 451,286 1,058,676 1,281,943 1,344,766 1,579,163
Wheat MPS 29,964 73,383 76,613 97,048 110,982
Maize MPS 6,552 64,228 110,380 125,433 172,343
Rice MPS -50,739 167,440 181,499 190,673 232,677
Soybeans MPS 5,500 12,637 10,925 9,614 17,160
Cotton MPS 12,101 40,301 53,293 13,710 6,554
Payments based on input 
use
99,886 124,715 129,158 137,396 118,135
Insurance fees subsidy 
for crops and livestock 
commodities
12,713 17,191 22,548 24,473 22,686
Fixed capital formation 67,734 86,912 84,150 87,730 76,121
Payments based on 
current A/An/R/I, 
production required
148,413 167,727 176,435 179,465 197,260
Direct payments to grain 
farmers
15,100 15,100 15,100 15,100 0
Agricultural input 
comprehensive subsidies
86,000 107,800 107,100 101,921 0
New Variety Extension 
Payment 2006–12 - Crops
22,000 20,900 26,105 21,445 0
Target price payments 
(Cotton)
0 0 0 7,022 19,804
Target price payments 
(Soybean)
0 0 0 0 2,950
Agricultural support 
payments
0 0 0 0 143,491
Percentage PSE (percent) 10 18 19 19 21
Source: Producer and Consumer Support Estimates database, OECD Agriculture statistics.
Table 2. Continued
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Wheat Maize
Rice, short 
and medium 
grain
Rice,  
long grain
Cotton
Initial quota in 2001 (ton) 7,884,000 5,175,000 1,662,500 1,662,500 780,750
Final quota in 2004 and 
onwards (ton)
9,636,000 7,200,000 2,660,000 2,660,000 894,000
In-quota duty (percent) 1 10 1 1 1
Out-quota duty (percent) 65 65 65 65 40
Table 3. China’s Tariff rate quota on grains and cotton
Source: WTO.
3.5. Recent Agricultural Policy Reforms
The phenomenon of the coexistence of high 
domestic production, increasing pressure to 
import due to higher domestic prices and the 
heavy burden of maintaining the large domestic 
stockholding of major commodities has 
prompted a rethinking of China’s agricultural 
policy, as reflected in the latest white papers 
known as No. 1 documents jointly issued each 
year by the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party and the State Council of 
China. In these documents (CCCPC and State 
Council 2015 and 2016; also see ICTSD 2016b 
for discussion), it is recognised that both 
domestic and international resources and 
markets are to be utilised to realise food grain 
security targets, and that the price formation 
and farm income transfer roles of domestic 
agricultural policy instruments are to be 
separated. The documents also declare that 
during times of lower world market prices, it 
should be possible to set aside land resources 
so long as food grain production capacities are 
effectively maintained. In the longer run, the 
capacity of grain supply should ultimately be 
secured by means of progress in agricultural 
technology.
Following the guidelines outlined in the No. 1 
documents, several changes have already been 
implemented. For rice and wheat, minimum 
prices in 2015 were fixed at 2014 levels, and 
in 2016 these minimum prices were either 
maintained at the levels of the previous two 
years or slightly adjusted downward (OECD 
2016). In the case of stable border prices, 
falling or flat minimum prices for the two 
products would imply reduced effective 
government assistance and smaller MPS.
For maize, in 2014 the floor prices used for 
implementing the temporary procurement and 
stockpiling programme in Northeast China were 
kept unchanged at the 2013 level, and in 2015 
these prices were lowered by more than 10 
percent as compared to 2015 (Fan et al. 2016). 
This downward adjustment in procurement 
price was followed by the abolition of the 
maize temporary procurement and stockpiling 
programme in 2016 to control the MPS for 
maize and the ballooning maize stock.
Aside from maize, major policy change in 
relation to cotton has also been undertaken in 
recent years. The temporary stockpiling policy 
for cotton was replaced by the so-called “target 
price system” in 2014. Under this new target 
price system, cotton farmers receive subsidies 
equivalent to the differences between market 
price and the pre-declared target price, should 
the former fall below the latter. Additionally, 
as the government essentially provides direct 
compensation, no government stockpiling is 
required; therefore, the new policy should 
help ease the pressure on further build-up of 
the already exceptionally high level of cotton 
stock. The cotton target price system is also 
designed mainly to favour cotton producers 
in the Xinjiang region with a higher target 
price where the subsidy is distributed mainly 
according to certified production delivered to 
the market, whereas in the rest of the country 
cotton producers receive a smaller direct 
subsidy. A pilot target price system on soybean 
has also been in place since 2014 in Northeast 
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China, whereby soybean producers receive the 
differences between a predetermined target 
price and the market price based on planting 
areas as opposed to actual production or 
market deliveries.
Another notable policy change is the 
consolidation of the three domestic subsidies 
(direct payments to grain producers, 
comprehensive agricultural input subsidies 
and new variety seed subsidies) into the 
uniform “agricultural support payments” in 
2015 in five provinces (OECD 2016); by 2016, 
this unification of domestic subsidies was to 
be implemented nationwide. According to 
the latest PSE estimate (Table 3), the unified 
agricultural support payment in 2015 was 
roughly the same as in the years immediately 
beforehand, at around ¥143.5 billion. The 
bulk of the new unified subsidy is paid out on 
a per unit of land basis, as for other individual 
payments in recent years, so it appears that 
little has changed regarding how these direct 
subsidies would affect producers’ production 
decisions. However, by consolidating the 
three existing payments into one uniform 
payment that is not tied to any particular 
inputs, it reveals the intention of the Chinese 
government to make these payments less 
coupled to actual production decisions such as 
the choice of crops and the use of particular 
inputs. Furthermore, by formally delinking 
the majority of these payments from the use 
of inputs such as fertilisers, it is possible that 
the size of these payments will be kept more 
stable and less responsive to future changes 
in input prices. If this proves to be the case, 
then it will be a major departure from how the 
comprehensive input subsidy was adjusted at 
the national and provincial levels in the past.
3.6. Summary
China’s market price support has been on the 
rise in recent years and reached substantial 
levels as measured in shares of gross farm 
receipts for China’s major agricultural 
commodities. This reflects increasing 
government assistance through price-based 
instruments and government stockholding on 
the one hand and rising domestic costs on the 
other hand. In addition, China’s spending on 
direct subsidies has also become an important 
budgetary item. The resulting burden of 
rising domestic production, increasing 
pressure to import and exceptionally high 
costs associated with holding large stocks 
has prompted changes in China’s agricultural 
policy. The government is moving towards 
less government stockholding, separation of 
the price formation and the income transfer 
role of market price support and stabilisation 
of government spending on direct subsidies. 
In the next section, we discuss the possible 
effects of these recent reforms as well 
as future policy options for individual 
agricultural products in the context of 
increasing production costs in China.
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4.1. Rice and Wheat: Reducing Minimum 
Prices and Other Policy Options
Rice and wheat are two of the most important 
agricultural products which feature prominently 
in China’s food security strategy. While 
successfully pursuing national self-sufficiency 
in these two products, the challenge facing 
policy makers (as reviewed above) concerns 
growing rice and wheat production at high 
costs, resulting in high levels of market price 
support and large and expensive government 
stocks. Although China’s market price support 
as calculated by the OECD (see Table 2) is 
designed for monitoring the development of 
agricultural support but not for determining 
whether such support is compliant with its WTO 
agricultural domestic support commitments, 
the large calculated MPS in recent years may 
still be a cause of concern. This is especially 
the case if other countries consider China’s 
domestic support level as calculated according 
to the WTO methodology to be in excess of the 
de minimis level allowed in its WTO accession 
agreement.8 Indeed, the US has recently 
challenged China’s “excessive” support for rice, 
wheat and corn (USDA 2016) and requested the 
establishment of a panel by the WTO to look 
into this case (WTO 2016).
In responding to these challenges, recent 
policy statements made by China seem to point 
to a more open attitude towards imports in 
the future. The recent statement in the No. 
1 documents regarding “utilizing domestic 
and international resources and domestic and 
international markets” is particularly relevant 
for the rice and wheat market, where up to now 
the TRQs for the two products (5.32 and 9.636 
million tons for rice and wheat respectively) 
have never been fully utilised. So within these 
quotas, there are certainly possibilities for 
China to increase its rice and wheat imports. At 
the same time, it appears that China may also 
be willing to limit its market price support by 
refraining from further increasing the minimum 
prices for rice and wheat in the presence of 
continuously rising product costs. The following 
analysis discusses domestic and trade policy 
options along these directions and analyses 
possible outcomes given alternative price 
trends on the world rice and wheat markets.
As shown in Figures 6 and 7, during the 2000–
2015 period, there was a consistent increase in 
the unit cost of production for both rice and 
wheat. An important driver for this was the 
rising unit labour costs. Rural–urban migration 
in China has reduced the size and changed the 
structure of the rural labour force available 
for agriculture production. With a diminishing 
number of young male farmers and a reduction 
of the number of farmers working exclusively in 
agriculture, the overall agricultural production 
labour force is expected to further decline in the 
next two decades (Carter, Zhong and Zhu 2012). 
At the same time, the labour force dedicated 
to agriculture will also become older. All these 
have contributed to rapidly rising labour costs 
for agriculture production. Cost hikes have 
been associated with rising domestic market 
prices for rice and wheat. Domestic prices in 
China for the two products followed the rising 
world market prices prior to the 2008–2011 
food price spikes, but fell behind during this 
period. As world market prices retreated after 
the crisis, Chinese costs and prices continued 
their upward movements, thereby resulting in 
4. RECENT AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORMS IN CHINA AND 
FUTURE POLICY OPTIONS
8 It should be noted that while the MPS as calculated by the OECD in its PSE estimates measures the support granted 
to producers through a myriad of government policies such as domestic subsidies and trade policies, it is not the 
same as the so-called Aggregated Measure of Support (AMS) for measuring a country’s domestic support in relation 
to its agricultural domestic support commitments under the WTO. The two measures, while related, are based upon 
different reference border and domestic prices, output volumes and base periods. For detailed discussions on China’s 
agricultural domestic support calculated in both the OECD MPS and the WTO method, readers are referred to a recent 
paper by Brink and Orden (2017).
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higher Chinese than world prices. While border 
protection measures (i.e. tariffs and quotas 
associated with the TRQs), minimum prices and 
domestic subsidies contributed to sustained 
output growth, rice and wheat imports have 
jumped sharply since 2010, as have the levels 
of rice and wheat stocks (see Figures 1 and 2).
Flat or decreasing minimum prices relative to 
the levels in 2014–2015 for the two products 
would imply effective reductions of market price 
support, if world market price levels stabilise 
at recent levels. In that case, domestic market 
prices may be lowered in the near future, 
resulting in output levels of rice and wheat that 
are likely to be lower than recent trend levels, 
thus reducing the pressure for further build-up 
of rice and wheat stocks. Regarding imports, 
the situation for rice and wheat markets is 
slightly different. As the domestic price of 
rice has already been above the corresponding 
tariff-inclusive world market price since 2014, 
it is likely that China’s rice imports will rise; 
however, the filling rate of the rice quota 
depends on how the rice quota is administered 
and how the quota is divided between private 
and public entities, as the latter tend to have 
lower filling rates of allocated rice quota. In 
the case of wheat, as the recent domestic price 
has just exceeded the tariff-inclusive world 
market price, the chances of the wheat TRQ 
being exceeded are therefore likely lower (see 
Figures 6 and 7). In the event of world market 
prices falling, the domestic-world market 
price gap would increase further. In that case, 
significantly lower domestic minimum prices 
would be needed to ease pressures which 
otherwise could lead to a large surge in imports 
and further build-ups of rice and wheat stock. 
However, should world market prices for rice 
and wheat rise (contrary to recent price trends 
on the world markets), pressures to reduce the 
minimum price and to import more would ease 
a little.
Reduced minimum prices, coupled with more 
effective utilisation of the TRQs for the two 
products, would likely result in higher import 
volumes and likely would also ease the pressure 
for the stock build-up as they decrease the 
incentives for production at higher costs. A 
lower level of market price support would also 
allow China to better face the pressure from its 
trading partners regarding its domestic support 
commitments. Given the high out-quota 
tariffs for rice and wheat, and the relatively 
small quotas (as compared to the domestic 
production of rice and wheat), the above 
scenario would not result in noticeable changes 
in self-sufficiency ratios for the two products.
Reduced minimum prices can also be used in 
combination with China’s new policy initiatives 
on consolidating the various direct payments. 
As these direct payments are further decoupled 
from producers’ production decisions (since 80 
percent of these payments are now formally paid 
on a per unit of land basis as one single payment), 
it is expected that the production-stimulating 
role of these payments diminishes, so as not to 
conflict with the objective of reducing minimum 
prices. Yu and Jensen (2010) conducted the first 
analysis of the potential impacts of decoupling 
China’s agricultural domestic support, which 
lends support to these expected benefits of 
decoupled domestic payments. The numerical 
results from that study show that in the 
hypothetical scenario of increasing domestic 
support spending up to China’s WTO de minimis 
limits using instruments tied to outputs and 
input uses for grains, there would be large 
increases of grain production over the baseline, 
a changing trade pattern seemingly contrary 
to China’s comparative advantage, increased 
rural employment, significantly higher farm 
income (over 12 percent) and a large negative 
allocation efficiency effect. While the baseline 
for conducting this hypothetical scenario is 
2005, it nonetheless appears to resemble the 
actual policy development after that time, and 
the simulated effects of production and trade 
patterns seem to parallel what has actually 
happened. Alternatively, if this additional 
domestic agricultural support up to China’s 
WTO de minimis was given as a single decoupled 
arable land-based payment, agricultural 
outputs and trade in China would remain 
unchanged, and rural employment would 
stay stable; however, as a way of transferring 
income, these decoupled payments are shown 
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to have higher income transfer efficiency 
and would cause virtually no production 
distortions to the economy (and hence have 
no welfare implications). More recently, 
preliminary results from a partial equilibrium 
model (Kimura and Yu 2016) show that in the 
case of wheat China’s market price support 
does boost production with the side effect of 
more intensive input use. Shifting from the 
market price support to more decoupled and 
WTO-compatible direct payments can support 
farm incomes at lower cost, while mitigating 
environmental pressures associated with 
intensive input use.
In summary, recent policy changes which 
reduce minimum prices for rice and wheat, 
together with changes to the design of the 
direct payments, seem to be positive steps for 
combating widening gaps between domestic and 
world market prices, and may also help to ease 
the pressure on stock build-up. Additionally, if 
China becomes more open to rice and wheat 
imports by facilitating the full utilisation of the 
rice and wheat TRQs, more of these products 
may be imported as a result. Additional imports 
beyond the quota levels for rice and wheat, 
however, depend on the subsequent evolution 
of the domestic–world price gaps, as the out-
quota tariffs (at 65 percent), freight costs and 
value-added taxes can together still act as a 
major barrier preventing these products from 
being imported on a larger scale.
Figure 6: Rice: rising domestic costs leading to higher domestic prices (US$/kg)
Source: domestic prices are sourced from China Agricultural Price Survey Yearbooks (中国农产品价格调查年鉴). World 
market prices are from World Bank. Unit cost refers to production cost per kilogram of outputs and unit labour cost refers 
to labour cost per kilogram of outputs; both are sourced from National Compilation of Cost and Revenue in Agricultural 
Production (全国农产品成本收益资料汇编).
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4.2. Cotton and Soybean: The New Target 
Price System and Domestic and Trade 
Policy Coordination
Compared to food grains, cotton production in 
China is even more labour-intensive and has 
been affected by labour costs rapidly rising 
with double-digit growth rates annually in 
recent years (see Figure 8). Rising labour costs 
have eroded the competitiveness of China’s 
exports of textile and clothing products, 
thereby threatening the growth prospects 
of domestic cotton consumption. They also 
raise the production cost of cotton, leading to 
further decline in the domestic cotton sector 
even in the presence of government support. 
To slow down the decline of domestic cotton 
production and to maintain a desirable level of 
self-sufficiency, a temporary procurement and 
stockpiling programme was implemented by 
the Chinese government during the 2011–2013 
period to allow the state-run cotton reserve 
system to stockpile cotton procured above 
world market prices. However, as world market 
prices receded from historically high levels 
in 2011 but domestic costs continued to rise, 
an expanding gap between China’s domestic 
price and international price was observed in 
the latter part of that period, leading to an 
upsurge in cotton imports as well as a rapid 
growth of cotton reserve stock. Financing 
this large stock placed a big fiscal burden on 
the Chinese government, as the downstream 
industries preferred cheaper imported cotton. 
Facing these challenges, China replaced the 
temporary procurement and stockpiling policy 
by the target price system in 2014.
After its implementation in the first year, the 
target price system seemed to have succeeded 
in bringing down domestic market prices 
(although production costs remained at levels 
far higher than both domestic and world 
market prices), and domestic production and 
imports also dropped in both 2014 and 2015. 
Consequently, ending stock levels in 2015 
decreased from the historical levels of 2014 
(Figures 3 and 8). As this new policy has only 
been implemented for two full years, it is 
not clear to what extent this policy will help 
alleviate the problems associated with high 
levels of public stocks in the cotton sector in 
the long run. China’s cotton policy also faces 
potential international challenges as it relates 
not only to its price setter position but also to 
China’s obligations under the WTO, especially 
if continued government support and the 
potential draw-down of its public stock lead to 
depressed world cotton prices.
To provide some insights into these questions, 
Yu (2016) investigates market and price effects 
of the target price system in the cotton sector 
under alternative world market price scenarios 
Figure 7: Wheat: rising domestic costs leading to higher domestic prices (US$/kg)
Source: see note to Figure 6.
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within a global computable general equilibrium 
modelling (CGE) framework known as the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP, see www.gtap.
org) where the target price system is explicitly 
represented. Using the most recent GTAP 
database (version 9; see Aguiar et al. 2016), 
two sets of hypothetical numerical experiments 
are conducted to explore the implied market 
outcomes and fiscal implications of the target 
price system under rising and falling domestic 
prices. Additionally, coordination between 
domestic agricultural policy and agricultural 
trade policy is also considered under these 
scenarios.
In the first scenario, in which world market 
prices are assumed to drop from recent high 
levels by 40 percent, simulation results as 
reported by Yu (2016) show that the domestic 
price of imported cotton would drop by a similar 
extent, which would also force down domestic 
market prices for cotton (see Appendix Table 
B). Consequently, cotton imports would 
rise. Against a predetermined target price, 
government compensatory payments would 
jump by over 50 percent, resulting in increased 
cotton subsidies of nearly US$6 billion. As 
producers are guaranteed the target price, 
domestic production stays almost flat. This is 
certainly not a desirable outcome, as the design 
of the target price system is to limit the extent 
of government subsidies to the cotton sector. 
Plausible alternative policy options would be 
either to increase the sliding scale tariff to 
curb imports exceeding the quota of 894,000 
tons and hence transmission of the lower world 
market price, or effectively to reduce the pre-
announced target price.9 In the former case, a 
hypothetical 20 percent increase in the sliding 
scale tariff of cotton is considered as an option, 
whereas in the latter case, a hypothetical 20 
percent “discount” is applied to the target 
price which normally triggers compensation to 
cotton producers.
Under the scenario of increasing the cotton 
sliding scale tariff by 20 percent, imported cotton 
prices and domestic market prices would drop 
by less, and increases in imports would be much 
smaller, due to increased import protection, 
leading to smaller increases in cotton subsidies. 
Under the scenario where the target price itself 
is effectively reduced, the price of imported 
cotton would drop substantially but domestic 
producer prices would also be reduced, due 
to the reduction of the target price: hence 
imports would surge while domestic cotton 
production would be reduced substantially. As 
the numerical simulation results show, cotton 
subsidies triggered by the target price would 
remain nearly unchanged, due to the reduced 
target price and reduced domestic cotton 
production.
On the other hand, should the world market 
price rise by 40 percent and the target price 
remain unchanged, the rising price of imports 
would drastically reduce import volumes 
and push up domestic cotton prices, thereby 
slightly reducing the fiscal burden on the 
target price system and raising domestic 
cotton production. Rising prices for imported 
cotton and domestic cotton can, however, be 
costly for the downstream textile and clothing 
apparel industry (which is still one of the main 
export sectors for China). If that consideration 
takes precedence, then policy makers may opt 
for the opposite, namely, either reductions 
of cotton sliding scale tariff or increasing the 
target price.
In summary, it does not appear to be the case 
that the target price system would easily be 
able to solve all aspects of China’s cotton 
problems. On the contrary, if future world 
market prices fluctuate, and particularly when 
world market prices continue to drop relative 
to Chinese prices, the target price system set 
at current price levels would face the risk of 
running up government spending on cotton 
subsidies. This outcome can only be avoided if 
the target price itself gradually falls—but that 
essentially implies lower levels of government 
assistance to the cotton sector.
9 One possible way to limit the fiscal burden in this case would be to discount either the price gap or the quantities for 
which cotton producers can be compensated. 
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Figure 8: Cotton: rising labour costs pushing domestic prices above world market prices (US$/kg)
Figure 9: Soybean: domestic prices higher than world market prices by wide margins (US$/kg)
Source: see note to Figure 6, except for the source of cotton prices which are the farm gate prices obtained from the PSE 
table of the OECD.
Source: see note to Figure 6.
In the case of soybean, minimal import 
protection has allowed for massive imports into 
China. Domestic production, on the other hand, 
has been paltry compared to imports. So China is 
essentially relying on the world market to meet 
its ever-increasing demand for this commodity 
(Figure 4). As Chinese costs and domestic 
prices of soybean have been consistently higher 
than the prevailing world market prices, mass 
imports have generally led to shrinking domestic 
soybean production (Figures 4 and 9). The recent 
announcement of applying the target price 
system in Northeast China is therefore unlikely 
to revitalise soybean production in the absence 
of policy space to increase import protection. 
However, recent discussion on reducing support 
for maize may, to some extent, redirect land 
resources in Northeast China towards soybean 
production, which may have some effects on the 
total production of soybean.
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4.3. Policy Changes in the Maize Sector  
and Future Policy Options
China’s maize sector has similarly experienced 
major issues in recent years in terms of rising 
costs and domestic prices, high domestic 
production and increasing imports, which have 
resulted in large quantities of stocks being 
held (Figures 5 and 10). China’s maize stock is 
estimated to have been more than 110 million 
tons at the end of 2015 according to USDA 
estimates, which is about half of China’s total 
maize production in that year. Fan et al. (2016) 
put China’s net increase in maize stock during 
2012–2014 alone at 150 million tons, whereas 
others suggest the total maize stock was much 
higher at around 250 million tons as of the 
beginning of 2016 (as reported in various media 
outlet such as www.ce.cn), which would have 
exceeded China’s annual production in 2015.
According to Fan et al. (2016), most of 
China’s current maize stock was accumulated 
during 2012–2014 due to the maize temporary 
procurement and stockpiling policy. This 
involved accumulated purchases of nearly 180 
million tons, with the costs of procurement, 
interests and warehousing estimated to be ¥43 
billion per year; however, the actual costs are 
likely higher if China decides to sell the stock at 
current prices. Other reports (e.g. China Finance 
and Economic News 2017) put the storage costs 
to be much higher at around ¥65 billion per year 
for the reported total stock of 250 million tons. 
With world market prices for maize and other 
coarse grains remaining at lower levels, and 
maize imports being constrained by the maize 
TRQ at 7.2 million tons and the high out-quota 
tariff of 65 percent (Table 4), China imported 
record amounts of substitute products such as 
sorghum, barley and dried distillers grains with 
solubles (DDGS), which further worsened the 
maize stock situation.
Facing these challenges, the Chinese 
government reversed recent policy trends by 
first freezing the temporary procurement and 
stockpiling price in 2014, and then in 2015 
dropping this floor price by about 10 percent 
(from 2.26 to 2.00 ¥/kg). It was announced in 
March 2016 by the NDRC that the temporary 
procurement and stockpiling programme for 
maize would be formally repealed in 2016 and 
be replaced by “market procurement” and 
subsidies to maize producers, as reported by 
various media outlets such as 中国经济网10. 
Details about the exact meaning of “market 
procurement” have yet to emerge; however, 
with government procurement and stockpiling 
being repealed, there will be no point issuing 
any floor price, as maize producers will be 
directly subsidised. Although the amount of 
subsidies to be paid to maize producers has not 
been released, it is reasonable to expect that 
these payments will at least partially offset the 
differences between production costs and the 
(likely lower) market price for maize.
The net outcome of recent reforms is likely to 
be: reduced maize planting areas and production 
in Northeast China and Inner Mongolia, slowing 
build-up of maize stock, continuing imports 
within China’s TRQ and possibly faster release of 
existing stock at subsidised prices, especially to 
the maize processing industry. In the immediate 
short run when planting decisions cannot be easily 
adjusted, it is expected that direct subsidies 
will become quite substantial to compensate 
for the loss to producers due to the repeal of 
the procurement and stockpiling policy. In the 
longer run, however, substantial reductions in 
maize planting area will be expected to reverse 
the increasing trend induced by the procurement 
and stockpiling policy (during the period of 
2008–2014, the maize planting area increased by 
25 percent to reach the level of 55.685 million 
ha), resulting in reduced outputs.
Whether or not China’s maize imports in the 
near future will rise depends on how and at 
what price the existing maize stock is drawn 
down. Fast stock release and the end of the 
maize procurement and stockpiling policy 
may lead to much lower domestic market 
prices, which could even possibly reduce maize 
imports in the short run. On the other hand, the 
possibility that exports may become another 
channel to reduce maize stock does not seem to 
10 www.ce.cn/cysc/sp/info/201605/25/t20160525_11990312.shtml, accessed 12 November 2016
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be realistic as this would likely imply very large 
effective export subsidies, which would not only 
be very costly to China but also run against the 
commitments to end export subsidies reached 
in the WTO Nairobi Declaration (ICTSD 2016a). 
In fact, in the case of China, no entitlement 
to export subsidies exists according to its WTO 
commitments. Other possibilities for limiting 
maize imports to aid the process of reducing 
existing maize stock include attempts to limit 
the imports of substitute products such as 
sorghum, barley and DDGS; however, in the 
absence of effective trade policy instruments 
such as tariffs higher than those allowed under 
China’s WTO commitment or tariff rate quotas, 
this is not likely to be possible except for the 
use of temporary trade remedies such as anti-
dumping duties and countervailing duties.11 
In summary, China’s huge maize stock, 
increasing maize planting area and domestic 
production at costs far higher than world 
market price have led to the recent reversal 
of the temporary procurement and stockpiling 
policy that had been in place for the better 
part of the past decade. In the short run, 
direct government subsidies to producers will 
be used to facilitate the difficult adjustments 
that need to take place as maize production 
and stockholding are reduced. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to expect that only after these 
difficult adjustments have been completed 
can China start a “lighter” approach towards 
its intervention in the maize sector, featuring 
lower government spending and lower levels of 
production, and possibly a smaller domestic–
world market price gap.
11 China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) launched anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations on DDGS imports 
originated from the US on 12 January 2016. On 12 January  2017 MOFCOM announced its ruling to impose anti-dumping 
duties between 42.2 percent to 53.7 percent and countervailing duties between 11.2 percent and 12 percent on these 
imports for the next five years (see MOFCOM 2017a and 2017b).
Figure 10: Maize: domestic prices consistently higher than world market prices (US$/kg)
Source: see note to Figure 6.
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This paper first provides a review of China’s 
agricultural production and trade patterns in the 
new millennium, focusing on rice, wheat, maize 
and soybean, as well as cotton. The first four 
products are considered food grains in China 
and have been subject to intensive government 
interventions using both domestic and trade 
policy instruments for the purposes of realising 
food security and self-sufficiency targets, while 
cotton has also been considered a strategic 
product for China’s downstream industries 
and because of its importance in the Xinjiang 
autonomous region. This review reveals that 
for rice, wheat and maize, despite continuous 
output growth, both imports and government 
stockholding have been on the rise. For cotton, 
production has also been characterised by a 
general rising trend in recent years but imports 
have also been higher, resulting in government 
stock exceeding annual domestic consumption. 
So at a first glance, rising production for all 
these four commodities is associated with rising 
pressure in imports and huge amounts of public 
stockholding. Ironically, China’s soybean sector, 
which has been subject to mass imports from the 
world market due to rising domestic demand and 
minimum import protection, has not suffered 
from the same symptoms, as its production 
level has been on a stable slight decline in the 
past decade while imports continue to rise. 
Relying on the world market to meet its soybean 
demand also reduces the need to hold a large 
reserve stock. Overall, regardless of the sectoral 
differences in production and trade, it is clear 
that China has transformed itself into a major 
importer of all five commodities, although self-
sufficiency ratios differ widely between food 
grains (rice, wheat and maize) and soybean and 
cotton.
This paper then points to the widening gaps 
between domestic and world market prices as 
a direct explanation of the recent development 
of China’s agricultural production and trade 
patterns. For rice and wheat, it appears that 
these gaps have been widening since the 2008 
world food price spikes. For maize and soybean, 
Chinese domestic prices have been consistently 
higher since 2000 and recent gaps have also 
been increasing. For cotton, Chinese domestic 
prices have also been higher for most years, 
and fluctuations on the world market have 
resulted in only a few years with higher world 
market price (such as in 2011 when the world 
market price reached historically high levels). 
In summary, the almost uninterrupted rising 
trends of domestic prices in China for all five 
commodities—a symptom of rising labour and 
other costs in China—directly explain their 
declining competitiveness on the world market.
To further understand how China has so far 
managed to maintain steady output growth 
in rice, wheat and maize and considerable 
production in cotton and soybean in spite of 
rising domestic costs and prices, this paper 
then discusses how the development of the 
major elements of China’s agricultural policy is 
connected to the observed market outcomes, 
particularly in relation to recent rising market 
price support and increasing domestic direct 
payments. Following this general discussion, 
detailed assessments of recent agricultural 
policy reforms and discussions of future policy 
options for each of the five commodities are 
carried out.
For rice and wheat, maintaining or effectively 
reducing minimum prices in the face of rising 
production costs appears to be the main policy 
instrument recently used by China to alleviate 
the build-up of stocks. Such actions would also 
help China to curb the rising market price support 
for these two products, which has recently led 
to complaints from the US alleging China was 
breaking its WTO agricultural domestic support 
commitments. Additionally, if the new strategy of 
“using domestic and international resources and 
utilizing domestic and international markets” 
covers these two products, then a more open 
attitude to their imports may also be expected, 
which may result in full utilisation of the rice 
and wheat import quotas. It is also possible that 
China may temporarily withdraw marginally 
productive land from active production through 
new land management plans. Lastly, recent 
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consolidation of various direct payments into 
the single agricultural support payment seems 
to further decouple these payments from 
actual production and input use decisions. The 
delinking of these payments from various inputs 
could be a signal that the government intends to 
limit future increases in these payments due to 
rising input prices.
In the case of cotton and soybean, the most 
notable change is the implementation of 
the target price system. This change is more 
significant for cotton than for soybean, as 
the “triple-high” symptom is most evident 
for the former product. By applying a target 
price that is set at a lower level than previous 
intervention prices and by repealing stockpiling, 
it is apparent that the target price system for 
cotton implies smaller government spending on 
supporting production, in addition to realising 
fiscal savings from reducing the sizable cotton 
stock. Nevertheless, the target price system as a 
market price-based intervention instrument will 
still leave the Chinese government exposed to 
uncertain compensation spending arising from 
price fluctuations. In particular, as illustrated by 
a model-based numerical illustration, relative 
decreases in world market prices would lead to 
rising compensation spending under the target 
price system; to avoid such an outcome, trade 
policy coordination may be needed in the form 
of a rising sliding scale tariff rate or a tightening 
of the supplementary quota. On the reverse side, 
rising world market prices, while being helpful 
for controlling compensation spending, can be 
similarly troublesome due to the need to control 
the impact on the downstream industry (i.e. the 
textile and apparel industry). In that case, policy 
makers would need to pursue reductions of the 
sliding scale cotton tariff or effective expansion 
of cotton. Adjustment of the target price itself 
could be another option, although this would 
require prior announcement for purposes of 
maintaining the credibility of the system itself.
The pilot target price system for soybean, on 
the other hand, is likely to be subject to fewer 
uncertainties regarding government budgetary 
considerations and market outcomes. The 
reason is that domestic production of soybean 
is relatively small compared to its domestic 
consumption and tariff barriers are almost non-
existent. Therefore, it is expected that the 
target price system will not generate drastically 
different market outcomes for soybean (unless 
the target price is set at an overly ambitious 
high level).
Among the four major grains, maize is perhaps 
the one that is currently undergoing the 
largest policy adjustment, as the temporary 
procurement and stockpiling policy gives way 
to “market procurement” and direct producer 
subsidies. While the exact details of the new 
system have yet to emerge, it is clear that 
dealing with the huge stock (estimated to be 
as high as 250 million tons) and ever-increasing 
planting area is the top priority. In the short run, 
such adjustment would not necessarily lead to 
larger imports into China, whereas spending on 
producer subsidies is likely to be substantial 
to moderate the shocks to producers and the 
domestic market. In the longer run, reduced 
outputs and planting areas are expected. After 
these domestic adjustments and as maize stock 
returns to lower and stable levels, it is possible 
that China may start to import more.
To sum up, facing the difficult situation of 
the “triple-high” phenomenon in the rice, 
wheat, maize and cotton sectors, China has 
undertaken major changes in its farm policy 
in the last couple of years, including major 
changes to the various problematic market 
price interventions backed by stockpiling policy, 
particularly for maize and cotton. Moving 
away from these costly instruments is a very 
positive development towards reducing swelling 
government stocks which drain fiscal resources 
and towards moderating expansion of high-cost 
domestic production. Regardless of whether 
these changes would lead to an immediate rise 
in imports, it is expected that they would lead 
to decreasing market price support which would 
improve China’s position in relation to its WTO 
agricultural domestic support commitments. 
On the other hand, whether China is truly 
fully embracing its recently declared strategy 
contained in the 2016 Policy Document no.1 
to “rely on both domestic and international 
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markets and resources” to realise grain security 
still remains to be seen. This is because 
decoupling still remains incomplete between 
price formation and income transfer roles of the 
new policy instruments (such as the target price 
system for cotton and soybean, the reduced 
floor prices for rice and wheat, as well as the 
new producer subsidies to maize producers).
The consolidated direct domestic subsidies can 
be another major positive step in China’s farm 
policy reform, if these direct subsidies under the 
new name of “agricultural support payment” are 
further decoupled from producers’ production 
and input use decisions. In fact, if such payments 
are totally delinked from considerations of input 
price changes, are given on a per unit of land 
basis and become uniform across Chinese regions 
and across different commodities, then the new 
consolidated payment may be considered a truly 
decoupled income transfer payment to farmers. 
In that case, it will have minimal production 
and trade distortion effects, thereby helping 
improve resource allocations among China’s 
agricultural subsectors, increasing the income 
transferring efficiency of these subsidies and 
enabling the government to control budgetary 
costs. Additionally, decoupled payments will 
also enable China to fulfil its WTO agricultural 
domestic support commitments.
In the longer run, with labour costs in China’s 
agricultural sector expected to rise continually 
due to rural–urban migration and changing rural 
demographics, Chinese agriculture is expected 
to undergo a further decline in comparative 
advantage. This is particularly the case for 
land-intensive products such as grains (see 
e.g. Anderson and Strutt 2014 for a projection 
of China’s increasing agricultural imports), 
suggesting a sustained fundamental conflict 
between the pursuit of high self-sufficiency 
ratios in grains and other important agricultural 
commodities and the constraints on government 
assistance to agriculture imposed by China’s 
fiscal resources and by its commitments at the 
WTO. Direct government interventions using 
market price tools and stockpiling have proven 
to be costly and inefficient in recent years, 
as well as contributing to allegations from 
China’s trading partners that the country is 
exceeding its WTO support ceilings. Moreover, 
the pursuit of high food grain self-sufficiency 
with intensive use of chemical inputs and land 
and water resources has also taken a toll on 
the environment and the natural resource base, 
thereby threatening China’s sustainability in 
the agriculture sector. In view of these long-run 
considerations, recent policy reforms should 
only be considered as interim steps to alleviate 
the immediate concerns. Longer-term solution 
would require further farm policy reforms, such 
as converting current market price support into 
true income transfers, and also more openness 
to trade, particularly for products where China’s 
comparative advantages have been eroded.
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APPENDIX
Production
Net 
import
End 
stock
Stock/use 
ratio (%)
Production
Net 
import
End stock
Stock/use 
ratio (%)
Rice Wheat
2000 131.5 -1.6 93.0 69% 99.6 -0.4 91.9 83%
2005 126.4 -0.6 36.8 29% 97.4 -0.3 34.5 34%
2006 127.2 -0.9 35.9 28% 108.5 -2.4 38.6 38%
2007 130.2 -0.7 37.8 30% 109.3 -2.8 39.1 37%
2008 134.3 -0.4 38.5 29% 112.5 -0.2 45.8 43%
2009 136.6 -0.3 40.5 30% 115.1 0.5 54.4 51%
2010 137.0 0.1 42.6 32% 115.2 0.0 59.1 53%
2011 140.7 2.6 45.0 32% 117.4 2.0 55.9 46%
2012 143.0 3.1 49.8 35% 121.0 2.0 54.0 43%
2013 142.5 4.1 53.1 37% 121.9 5.9 65.3 56%
2014 144.6 4.9 57.4 40% 126.2 1.1 76.1 65%
2015 145.8 4.7 63.2 44% 130.2 2.7 97.0 87%
Maize Soybean
2000 106.0 -7.2 102.4 85% 15.4 13.0 4.9 18%
2005 139.4 -3.7 35.3 26% 16.4 28.0 4.6 10%
2006 151.6 -5.3 36.6 25% 15.1 28.3 1.8 4%
2007 152.3 -0.5 38.4 26% 12.7 37.4 2.5 5%
2008 165.9 -0.1 51.2 33% 15.5 40.7 7.5 15%
2009 164.0 1.1 51.3 31% 15.0 50.2 13.2 22%
2010 177.2 0.9 49.4 27% 15.1 52.1 14.5 22%
2011 192.8 5.1 59.3 32% 14.5 59.0 15.9 22%
2012 205.6 2.6 67.6 34% 13.1 59.6 12.4 16%
2013 218.5 3.3 81.3 39% 12.0 70.1 13.9 17%
2014 215.6 5.5 100.5 50% 12.2 78.2 17.0 20%
2015 224.6 3.1 110.7 51% 11.6 82.4 16.0 17%
Cotton
2000 4.4 0.0 4.3 87%
2005 6.2 4.2 4.9 52%
2006 7.7 2.3 4.5 43%
2007 8.1 2.5 4.5 42%
2008 8.0 1.5 4.7 50%
2009 7.0 2.4 3.1 28%
2010 6.6 2.6 2.3 23%
2011 7.4 5.3 6.8 82%
2012 7.6 4.4 11.0 140%
2013 7.1 3.1 13.7 182%
2014 6.5 1.8 14.6 197%
2015 4.8 0.9 12.7 166%
Table A. China’s production, net imports, end stock and stock/use ratios: five major commodities 
(million ton and percent)
Source: USDA PSD online, accessed August 2016.
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Table B. Simulated effects of changes in world market price and China’s cotton policy on the 
cotton markets
Percentage changes 
(unless otherwise noted)
World 
cotton price 
drops by 40 
percent
World cotton 
price drops by 
40 percent and 
sliding scale tariff 
increases by 20 
percent
World cotton 
price drops by 
40 percent and 
cotton target 
price decreases 
by 20 percent
World 
cotton price 
increases by 
40 percent
Domestic price of 
imported cotton
-37.5 -25.0 -37.5 37.5
Domestic market price of 
cotton
-35.9 -25.1 -4.6 4.7
Cotton subsidies 55.9 33.4 0.0 -1.7
Changes in spending on 
cotton subsidies (million 
US$)
6,270.9 4,393.6 -0.3 -374.5
Quantities of cotton 
imports
6.8 1.4 69.7 -30.0
Quantities of cotton 
outputs
0.4 0.6 -33.3 22.0
Source: simulation results reported by Yu (2016).
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